Saudi Offensive Eyes 100,000 Troops to Reopen Red Sea Shipping Lane

For logistics operators, freight forwarders and shippers, Bab el-Mandeb is not a distant battlefield, it is a chokepoint whose closure reroutes vessels around the Cape of Good Hope and reprices war-risk insurance across the Suez-Red Sea route. Houthi control of the strait and this year's attacks on Saudi shipping and oil infrastructure have already put pressure on transit reliability; the planned Saudi offensive is, in effect, a military operation to reopen a trade lane.

Saudi Arabia is preparing a military offensive against Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen designed to reverse the group's recent seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb strait and reopen the Red Sea shipping corridor, according to a Reuters investigation published October 2, 2026, based on interviews with six regional and Western officials. The operation is expected to launch within weeks and would be led by Yemeni ground forces overseen by Riyadh, supported by Saudi airstrikes. Gulf and Yemeni officials told Reuters that more than 100,000 Yemeni troops could be mobilized depending on whether the kingdom chooses a narrowly focused assault on Bab el-Mandeb or a broader synchronized offensive across the governorates of Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz and Al-Jawf.

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Saudi Arabia first entered Yemen's civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition backing the internationally recognized government, which the Houthis had driven from the capital Sanaa.

The plan marks the most significant Saudi military escalation in Yemen since the 2022 truce that largely froze the conflict. Saudi Arabia first entered Yemen's civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition backing the internationally recognized government, which the Houthis had driven from the capital Sanaa. That truce held for years but began to unravel this year when the Houthis launched missile and drone attacks on Saudi shipping and oil infrastructure, a spillover from the wider Iran war. The decisive shift came last month, when Houthi forces advanced down Yemen's coast and seized the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the narrow waterway linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, by extension, the Suez Canal route. Control of that chokepoint gives the group leverage over one of the world's most consequential maritime corridors.

The reported division of labor is notable. The United States is already providing intelligence to support Riyadh's operations, while some regional and European nations are contributing mainly defensive military aid. None of the kingdom's allies are expected to take a direct combat role, according to the officials, who requested anonymity to discuss security preparations. That structure concentrates the fighting burden on Yemeni ground forces, raised, trained and overseen by Riyadh, and on Saudi airpower, while Western partners remain one step removed in an enabling role. It echoes the architecture of earlier phases of the Yemen war but with a narrower objective: break the Houthi chokehold rather than restore the full territorial status quo.

Strategically, the two options on the table carry very different risk profiles. The narrow option, an attack focused on the area around Bab el-Mandeb, is more achievable and directly targets the chokepoint, but it would leave Houthi positions and launch capabilities intact elsewhere. The broader option, with synchronized attacks across multiple fronts, offers a more durable reversal of Houthi gains but risks a protracted and costly campaign that could re-escalate the wider conflict. The choice will signal Riyadh's risk appetite and its confidence in Yemeni proxy forces to hold territory once taken.