Two Weeks Added: Saudi VLCCs Avoid Red Sea, Disrupting Global Oil Supply Chains

For supply chain managers, this rerouting of six supertankers around the Cape of Good Hope is more than a geopolitical footnote—it’s a tangible strain on just-in-time oil deliveries. With voyage durations effectively doubling, lead-time variability spikes, requiring larger safety stocks and renegotiated shipping arrangements. Logistics planners must now factor in a structural shift in the world’s most critical energy transit corridor.

In a dramatic escalation of maritime security risks, six supertankers owned by Saudi Arabia’s national shipping company Bahri have turned away from the Bab el-Mandeb strait, embarking on a rare voyage around Africa to avoid Houthi rebel attacks. The decision, first reported on July 31, 2026, marks a significant operational pivot for a kingdom that has long relied on the Red Sea route for crude oil exports to Europe and beyond. Two of the very large crude carriers (VLCCs), Hazm and Dilam, are signaling Gibraltar, a major Mediterranean refueling hub, while four others—Ghinah, Laynah, Salam, and Burqan—are indicating South African ports Durban or Algoa Bay, standard waypoints for vessels circumventing the continent.

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In a dramatic escalation of maritime security risks, six supertankers owned by Saudi Arabia’s national shipping company Bahri have turned away from the Bab el-Mandeb strait, embarking on a rare voyage around Africa to avoid Houthi rebel attacks.

The immediate catalyst is the persistent threat from Iran-backed Houthi militants, who since late 2023 have attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea in response to the conflict in Gaza. While many international carriers had already rerouted, Saudi tankers had largely maintained some transit until now, partly by leveraging the Yanbu-to-Sidi Kerir pipeline (SUMED) to bypass the most dangerous stretches. However, the Houthis recently threatened to directly target vessels calling at Saudi Red Sea ports, forcing even the kingdom’s own fleet to reconsider. The six Bahri tankers were empty, suggesting they had either discharged cargo in Asia or were repositioning, but their choice to avoid Bab el-Mandeb entirely signals a loss of confidence in safe passage through the waterway.

Adding at least two weeks to a voyage from the Middle East to Europe or the Americas not only inflates bunker fuel costs and crew expenses but also ties up vessel capacity, effectively reducing the available global VLCC fleet. The standard journey from the Persian Gulf to Northwest Europe via Suez takes roughly 12–14 days; the Africa route doubles that to about 25–30 days, covering over 6,000 extra nautical miles. For oil markets, this duration extension creates a time-lag in crude delivery that can disrupt refinery scheduling and increase the need for floating storage. If the practice becomes widespread or permanent for Saudi exports, it will structurally lift tanker demand and freight rates along the Cape of Good Hope route. Already, spot rates for VLCCs have been elevated, and this development may provide further support.

At the same time, the tanker market is seeing bifurcated behavior. Chinese and Pakistani-flagged vessels, along with some opportunistic owners like South Korea’s Sinokor Group, continue to transit Bab el-Mandeb, signaling Suez Canal or other Red Sea destinations. The Gabon Prosperity and Rain Cubic, both empty VLCCs, entered the Red Sea on Thursday, apparently betting that their flags and ownership provide a degree of protection—or that the lucrative premiums for risky voyages outweigh the dangers. This divergence highlights a classic risk-on/risk-off dynamic in maritime logistics, with state-linked fleets and discount-seeking operators on one side and top-tier commercial carriers on the other.